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Microeconomic reform dominated Australian economic policy from the early 1980s
until the end of the 20th century. Despite strong claims of success, focusing on the
economic expansion since 1992, and rapid productivity growth between 1993-94 and
1998-99, evidence of improvements in the performance of the economy as a whole is
weak and inconclusive. For an adequate evaluation of the microeconomic reform period,





O4Looking back on microeconomic reform: a skeptical viewpoint
The era of microeconomic reform in Australia began with a big bang – the floating
of the dollar in 1983. It ended with another big bang – the package of tax reforms centred
on the Goods and Services Tax (GST) which came into force in July 2000. The period
between 1983 and 2000, roughly corresponding to the 1980s and 1990s, was one of
systematic, though gradual, microeconomic reform affecting nearly all sectors of the
economy.
There were isolated instances of microeconomic reform before the 1980s, notably
including the Whitlam government’s 25 per cent tariff cut (the primary motive here was
macroeconomic, but the choice of instrument reflected microeconomic concerns). Similarly,
the consequences of some microeconomic reforms initiated in the 1990s, such as National
Competition Policy are still being worked through, and a few items on the microeconomic
reform agenda, such as the full privatisation of Telstra, are still being debated. Moreover,
movement in the direction of microeconomic reform was never uniform. The Prices and
Incomes Accord constituted a major change in the way Australian labour markets operated,
but was not generally considered as an instance of microeconomic reform.
Despite these qualifications, the 1980s and 1990s can reasonably be characterised
as the era of microeconomic reform in Australia. Throughout this period, there was a
steady movement in the direction of microeconomic reform, backed by a bipartisan, and
almost monolithic, intellectual consensus, at least among policy elites. No such consensus
existed before the 1980s.
Most economic evaluations of microeconomic reform in Australia and elsewhere,
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particularly those from official sources, have been favorable. Parham (2002a) is a goodrecent example. In the light of this favorable evaluation, there have been calls for a
renewed commitment to microeconomic reform (Dawkins and Kelly 2003). On the other
hand, it is widely recognised that the Australian public is suffering from ‘reform fatigue’
and evinces little support for further microeconomic reform. In view of the fact that the
public has had two decades to evaluate the effects of microeconomic reform, these
observations pose a problem. Either the official estimates of the benefits of microeconomic
reform are overoptimistic or members of the public have consistently misperceived the
effects of reform on their welfare.
The object of this paper is to present a skeptical evaluation of microeconomic
reform in Australia, without an initial presumption that reform is either beneficial or
harmful. The paper is organised as follows. Definitions of the concept of ‘microeconomic
reform’ are discussed and the policy agenda associated with this term is described.
Several phases of microeconomic reform are distinguished. The program of microeconomic
reform is then evaluated on a number of criteria, including impacts on macroeconomic
performance, allocative efficiency, productivity, work intensity and consumer choice.
Finally, some concluding comments are offered.
Defining microeconomic reform
Although microeconomic reform is notoriously difficult to define, the central idea is
that policy should be directed to achieve improvements in economic efficiency, either by
removing distortions in individual sectors of the economy or by reforming economy-wide
policies such as tax policy and competition policy with an emphasis on economic efficiency
(rather than other goals such as equity or employment growth).
Considering the term ‘microeconomic reform’ in more detail, the ‘microeconomic’
element is significant in two ways. First, the shift to a focus on microeconomic reform
represented an acknowledgement that macroeconomic policies, and particularly Keynesian
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demand management, were no longer as effective as they had appeared to be during thelong postwar boom. Microeconomic reform was seen by some of its advocates as a way
of removing structural barriers to the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy. Other
advocates of microeconomic reform, influenced by new classical models, saw little role
for macroeconomic policy, and argued that the main task of economic reform was to
remove the distortions created by previous interventionist policies.
The term ‘reform’ literally means ‘change of form’. However, in its positive uses, it
embodies two additional connotations. The first is ‘change for the better’. The second is
the idea of change that is, in some sense, historically inevitable. Both of these elements
were present in discussions of microeconomic reform particularly in the wake of the
collapse of Communism, and were embodied in the slogan attributed (perhaps apocryphally)
to Margaret Thatcher: ‘There is No Alternative’. A more sophisticated version of the
same claim was made by Fukuyama (1992). Critics of microeconomic reform, who had
often been supporters of interventionist economic policies that were also described as
reforms at the time they were implemented, initially resisted the use of the term ‘reform’
to describe policies they regarded as producing changes for the worse. However, the term
‘microeconomic reform’ is now used in much the same way by supporters, opponents
and sceptics alike.
Microeconomic reform may be defined as a systematic program of reform along
market-oriented lines and focusing on microeconomic issues rather than macroeconomic
policy.
In the light of this discussion, the statement made above that ‘the Prices and
Incomes Accord ... is not typically considered as an instance of microeconomic reform’
may be clarified. The Accord does not meet the definition of microeconomic reform
partly because it was motivated by macroeconomic concerns and partly because it sought
to produce outcomes different from those that would be generated by market forces.
More generally, on this definition, there was no systematic commitment to micro-
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economic reform before 1983, despite some policy initiatives consistent with the ideasunderlying microeconomic reform. Similarly, Australian state and national governments
are no longer pursuing systematic programs of microeconomic reform.
International experience
Although the specific term ‘microeconomic reform’ is most popular in Australia,
closely related policies were pursued throughout much of the world in the 1980s and
1990s, commonly  described in such terms as ‘structural reform’. The policies adopted in
Australia were largely modelled on those of the Thatcher government in the United
Kingdom, which were also emulated in New Zealand and Canada. Radical market-oriented
reforms were adopted in Eastern Europe and Russia after the collapse of communism,
accelerating an earlier more gradual trend towards a larger role for the market. Under
pressure from agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
many less developed countries also abandoned interventionist policies, such as import
replacement and public ownership, and embraced policies of liberalisation and privatisation.
Debate over whether the effects of reform have been beneficial or harmful on
balance has yielded little in the way of firm conclusions. This is unsurprising given the
potential for disagreement over criteria, counterfactuals and measurement criteria, which
will be discussed in more detail with respect to Australia.
Nevertheless, some countries have clearly performed better than others. For example,
Australia has outperformed New Zealand. This fact has given rise to a debate over reform
strategies, which has focused on two main issues. The first is the choice between radical
restructuring (sometimes referred to as Shock Therapy) and gradual reform. Among
advocates of gradual reform, there is a further debate about sequencing. The issue is
whether it is preferable to delay some reforms to a later stage of the reform process and,
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if so, which (Buckle 1987)The microeconomic reform agenda
The term ‘microeconomic reform’ encompasses a wide range of policies and the
content of the microeconomic reform agenda has changed over time. Nevertheless, in
most periods, one or two central themes have dominated the policy agenda.
Getting prices right
In the early phases of microeconomic reform, much attention was focused on ‘getting
prices right’, and, in particular, on eliminating policies that unnecessarily ‘distorted’ the
production and consumption decisions of private firms and households. The paradigmatic
example of a ‘distorting’ policy was tariff protection. The case for tariff reform was
bolstered by the argument that, if a government wished to assist particular industries it
should do so through subsidies, which did not distort the prices faced by consumers.
Under the policy of ‘protection all round’, the impact of tariffs on agricultural
producers had been partially offset by a range of price stabilisation and support policies.
The gradual removal of these polices began with the Whitlam government’s controversial
abolition of a bounty on purchases of superphosphate and the 25 per cent cut in tariffs,
introduced in July 1973.
The consensus in favour of ‘protection all round’ had marginalised both advocates
of the traditional free-trade alternative to protection and supporters of strategic industry
policies and microeconomic planning. As a result, advocates of more comprehensive and
systematic government intervention, such as Whitlam, initially made common cause with
those who favoured extensive free-market reform. Both groups were classed as ‘economic
rationalists’,
1 that is, advocates of rationally-designed policy, as opposed to the advocates
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1 For further discussion of the genesis of the term 'economic rationalism' see Quiggin (1997a)
and Schneider  (1998).
of the status quo in which policy was driven by a mixture of historical precedent,lobbying, and ad hoc responses to crises. Under the Fraser government, the free-market
element of economic rationalism become dominant, and the term came to imply a desire
to reduce the role of government rather than, as under Whitlam, to apply the power of
government more rationally and systematically.  Much later, following the popular critique
of Pusey (1991), ‘economic rationalist’ acquired a primarily pejorative connotation.
Under the case-by-case approach pursued during the 1970s proposals for tariff
reform were initially most successful in industries with relatively low protection. In the
highly protected industries most threatened by import competition, such as motor vehicles
and textiles, clothing and footwear, tariffs were supplemented by quotas. As a result, the
variance of effective rates of protection increased substantially during the 1970s, as
shown in Table 1. The first two rows of data show the mean and variance of tariff rates
from 1971 to 1991.
Table 1:  Effective rates of protection (%) 1971–91
Mean effective protection 
rate
Standard deviation of 
effective protection rates
Year ending June 30
1971 1973 1983 1988 1991
36 27 25 19 15
25 20 43 36 29
Source:Industry Commission
It was not until 1988 that the case-by-case approach was replaced by a general
program of reducing tariff rates across-the-board, a process that is still incomplete.
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Corporatisation and privatisationA second strand of microeconomic reform focused on improving the efficiency of
government business enterprises. One of the first, and most successful, instances was the
creation of the statutory authorities Australia Post and Telecom Australia from the former
Postmaster-General's Department, a public service department under direct ministerial
control. More generally, the reform of government provision of marketed services may be
seen in terms of a spectrum. At one end is the traditional departmental structure of
national, state and local governments. At the other end is a privatised firm, subject only to
normal commercial regulation. The points on the spectrum include:





Each step along the reform spectrum involves an increase in reliance on profit as
the primary guide to management decisions, and a reduction in direct public accountability.
These two changes are directly linked: increases in profitability arise precisely because
managers are not subject to constraints imposed through public accountability, and are
therefore free to manage enterprises so as to increase revenues and reduce costs.
From the perspective of advocates of microeconomic reform, the object of reform
has been to move as far towards privatisation as possible, subject to constraints arising
from potential market failures or political restrictions. Under National Competition Policy,
traditional arrangements are considered, prima facie, to be anticompetitive, and govern-
ments are required to consider options such as commercialisation and corporatisation.
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed that movement along the reform
spectrum led inexorably to full privatisation. By the late 1990s, however, political resistance
to privatisation had hardened. A central element in the decline of support for privatisation
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was the realisation that the budgetary arguments that had been used to justify earlyprivatisations in Australia and the United Kingdom were spurious. The budgetary
conventions prevailing until the mid-1990s allowed the proceeds of asset sales to be
treated as current revenue or, in some cases, negative expenditure.
In assessing the fiscal impacts of privatisation, the appropriate comparison is between
the sale price and the present value of income foregone as a result of privatisation. In
most cases, if this comparison is undertaken using the real bond rate as a discount rate,
sale proceeds are less than the present value of earnings foregone on any reasonable
estimate (Quiggin 1995; Walker and Walker 2000). The divergence is primarily due to
the ‘equity premium’, that is, the difference between the real rate of interest on bonds and
the rate of return demanded by investors in private equity. This difference, about 6
percentage points on most estimates, is too large to be consistent with the standard
consumption-based capital asset pricing model, under which asset prices are determined
by consumers rationally optimising the expected utility of lifetime consumption in efficient
asset markets (Mehra and Prescott 1985; Kocherlakota 1996).
Moreover, the equity premium is independent of any divergences in public and
private discount rates arising from differential taxation treatment and from transfers that
may be associated with underpricing in cases of privatisation by public float. Differences
arising from the latter sources should be netted out in the evaluation of privatisation.
There are strong grounds for supposing that observed market imperfections, such as
transactions costs in household borrowing and lending (Constantinides, Donaldson, and
Mehra 1998) and the absence of insurance markets for systematic risks such as
unemployment and business failure (Mankiw 1986; Weil 1989; Grant and Quiggin 2002)
play an important role in explaining the anomalously large equity premium. If so, as
Grant and Quiggin (2002) observe, the appropriate discount rate for evaluating privatisation
is likely to be close to the real bond rate, implying that most Australian privatisations
have reduced welfare.
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Supporters of privatisation have argued for a presumption in favour of the marketrate (Hathaway 1997), or have sought to change the focus of the argument away from
fiscal impacts to broader efficiency effects (Officer 1999). In the absence of evidence
supporting the use of the market rate, the first position is purely ideological. As regards
the second, it is important to take account of impacts on consumers, employees and
others. But assuming the sale price is equal to the private market value of earnings under
privatisation, a comparison of this sale price with the present value of expected earnings
under continued public ownership captures the main efficiency effects of privatisation.
Deregulation and reregulation
The first big instance of deregulation in Australia was the deregulation of financial
markets in the 1980s, following the recommendations of the Campbell and Martin
Committees of Inquiry and the decision to float the Australian dollar in 1983. Deregulation
of the airline industry, and the abandonment of the long-standing two-airlines policy,
followed in 1990.
Reforms to telecommunications and energy markets in the 1990s are also commonly
referred to as ‘deregulation’. In these cases, where a relatively simple, though highly
restrictive regulatory regime, based on publicly-owned statutory monopolies, has been
replaced by a complex set of regulations designed to facilitate competition, ‘reregulation’
might be a more appropriate term. Continued use of the term ‘deregulation’ reflects, in
part, the idea that the new regulatory structures are interim measures, paving the way for
the emergence of a fully competitive market.
Measured against the, admittedly ambitious, objective of a competitive outcome
requiring only the basic regulatory functions of standard company law, deregulation in
Australia has been almost uniformly unsuccessful. In banking, the position of incumbent
firms has been strengthened, most notably by mergers allowed in anticipation of
deregulation. Entry by foreign banks, regarded ex ante as the main source of competition,
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has been limited and transient. Competition has been further reduced by the virtualdisappearance of the building society sector when the regulatory costs of a banking
license were removed, while the implicit Commonwealth government guarantee, arising
from the Reserve Bank’s role as lender of last resort, remained in place. This trend has
been partially offset by the emergence of non-bank mortgage originators in the 1990s.
The abolition of the two-airlines policy induced a number of competitors to enter
the market from 1990 onwards.  The first two entries, both using the name Compass,
were costly failures. Although external factors, such as the first Gulf War, played a role,
the entrants were poorly capitalised and there were extensive barriers to entry, notably
including the incumbents' control of terminals. Pressure to liberalise access to terminals
developed in the wake of the Compass failures, but the incumbents built up alternative
barriers to entry such as frequent flier schemes. A number of other enterprises announced
plans to enter the market during the 1990s but failed to secure the necessary finance. A
third failure was the attempt by regional airline Impulse to enter the capital city market,
beginning in 2000. Shortly after Impulse commenced service, the fourth (and so far the
only successful) entrant, Virgin Blue also entered the market. Unlike previous entrants,
Virgin Blue had the backing of an international carrier.
The success of Virgin's entry depended on a series of adverse events that had
fatally weakened one of the incumbent airlines, Ansett. The last of these was the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001, which occurred immediately after Ansett's declaration of
bankruptcy, and ensured that attempts to refloat the airline would not succeed. Thus, the
competitive entry of Virgin has resulted in the replacement of the symmetrical duopoly
imposed under the two-airline policy with a Stackelberg leader–follower model.
The outcome in the telecommunications sector has been similar, with Telstra acting
as a Stackelberg leader. Of course, this outcome represents an increase in competition
relative to the starting point of statutory monopoly. Similarly, in the electricity sector,
although there are more firms than before, most retail consumers are effectively dealing
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with monopolists.Even on the more limited criterion of reductions in prices, success has been limited.
The interest rate margins charged by banks to household customers rose in the aftermath
of the speculative boom and bust of the 1980s. Although margins have subsequently
fallen, this has been offset by a steady increase in fees and charges.
Business class and standard economy airfares have generally risen, but the proportion
of discount fares and the size of discounts has increased. Using an index number approach,
Quiggin (1997b) concluded that there had been no significant change in the cost of a
standard basket of air fares, consisting of a mixture of business class, full economy and
discount fares. Forsyth (1998) criticised the claim that discount fares should be treated as
a separate commodity and concluded that average fares had fallen as a result of deregulation.
Bailey (2003) finds little change in prices between 1992 and 2003.
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Prices of telecommunications services have fallen in real terms, but this reduction
has merely continued a trend that prevailed throughout the 20th century. More precisely,
the regulatory constraints on Telstra's prices embody a requirement to continue the rate of
price reductions observed before the advent of competition. In most years, this constraint
has been binding, implying that the aggregate impact of reregulation on prices has been
zero. As with airlines, there has been a redistributive effect. Consumers with more elastic
demand and lower marginal costs of service, have benefited at the expense of those with
less elastic demand and higher marginal costs. In this case, unlike that of airlines, the
redistribution has generally favored business at the expense of households. (In both
cases, it must be assumed that reductions in business costs ultimately flow through to
households.)
The most striking single outcome of deregulation was the speculative boom and
bust  in equity markets in the 1980s, the magnitude of which was largely attributable to
11
2 A more relevant comparison would be the change in airfares compared to that which would
have taken place under continued regulation. Presumably this would have been relatively modest over the
short period assessed by Quiggin and Forsyth, but might have been significant over the 1990s as a while.
financial deregulation. The rise of ‘entrepreneurs’ engaged in speculative takeovers waswidely seen as a positive outcome of financial deregulation, imposing market discipline
on lazy incumbent managers (Bishop, Dodd and Officer 1987). In retrospect, however, it
is apparent that the entrepreneurs had little capacity to improve the value of the enterprises
the controlled and primarily illustrated the maxim, attributed to JK Galbraith, that ‘genius
is a rising market’. When equity prices declined after 1987, the corporate structures built
up by the entrepreneurs collapsed with heavy losses.
No accurate estimate of the welfare loss associated with this episode has been
made. However, Sykes (1994) estimates the volume of losses incurred by creditors and
bondholders at $20 billion or around 5 per cent of annual GDP in the 1980s.
3 As was
noted by Milbourne and Cumberworth (1992), much of this loss was transferred to retail
customers of the banks in the form of increased margins between borrowing and lending
rate.
Another substantial welfare loss arose from the parallel rollouts of hybrid fibre
optic cable undertaken by Telstra and Optus in the mid-1990s. At a cost greater than
would have been incurred in an orderly rollout of cable for all metropolitan areas, Telstra
and Optus produced two sets of cables, each covering about half the population, with an
overlap estimated at 90 per cent. The total welfare loss was at least $4 billion and
possibly as much as $8 billion (1 to 2 per cent of GDP).
Against these losses must be set improvements in operating efficiency, associated
with reductions in overstaffing and the elimination of restrictive work practices. Based on
observed changes in prices, the net impact appears to be about neutral in the case of
telecommunications and airlines. On the other hand, as noted above, financial deregulation
produced a substantial welfare loss in its first decade from 1983 to 1993. Outcomes since
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3 Since other losses were incurred by employees, customers and so on, this is likely to be a
lower bound estimate of welfare costs. On the other hand, in a complete analysis it would be necessary to
take account of gains to ‘entrepreneurs’. Despite the fact that most of the leading entrepreneurs incurred
personal as well as corporate bankruptcy, it appears that a number of them managed to retain significant
personal wealth after the crash, in addition to consumption expenditure during the boom.
1993 appear more favorable, but a final evaluation must await the end of the currentboom in housing prices.
Competition and competition policy
During the 1990s, the process of microeconomic reform changed radically, as did its
content. Increasing public resistance to policies such as privatisation, combined with an
upsurge of hostility to ‘economic rationalism’ in general, made it difficult to implement
reform through political processes, except in a crisis atmosphere such as that following
the collapse of state banks in Victoria and South Australia.
As a result, reform in the 1990s was often implemented without open political
debate. The most notable example was National Competition Policy (NCP), which grew
out of the report of the Hilmer Committee (Hilmer, Rayner and Taperell 1993), appointed
in 1992 to inquire into and advise on appropriate changes to legislation and other measures
in relation to the scope of the Trade Practices Act  1974 and the application of the
principles of competition policy. Advocates of reform within Federal government policy
circles used the Hilmer Report as the basis for a renewed push for public sector reform,
centred around the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).
By virtue of its reliance on inter-governmental negotiations and remoteness from
open political debate, the COAG process permitted further extensions of reform to be
presented as a fait accompli, embodied in the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995, and
the associated Competition Principles Agreement. By the time its implications were
realised, NCP was both Commonwealth and state law, backed up by the power of the
National Competition Council (NCC) to penalise recalcitrant or tardy states.
This process in turn produced a counter-reaction, in which NCP became a scapegoat
for all the adverse consequences of microeconomic reform and for many trends independent
of microeconomic reform. A typical example was the closure of banks in country towns,
which was due in part to financial deregulation and in part to long-standing demographic
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trends, but had nothing to do with NCP.The NCP program had three main components. The first was a once-off review of
all state and federal legislation, requiring that any legislation with anti-competitive effects
should be justified on the grounds of public benefit. A notable outcome was the deregulation
of the dairy industry, discussed by Edwards (2003). The second was a requirement for
government business enterprises to adopt prices based on the principle of ‘competitive
neutrality’. The third, and in the end the most significant, was the creation of a new
system of regulatory oversight for  public and private enterprises declared as monopolies.
At least at first sight, it may appear paradoxical that the ultimate outcome of NCP
was a substantial expansion of regulation. The implementation of NCP required the
establishment of the NCC and the formation of a more powerful Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) from the former Trade Practices Commission and
Prices Surveillance Authority. In addition, each of the states established regulatory bodies.
In one sense, this expansion of regulation represents a retreat from the original
aspirations of advocates of microeconomic reform, who hoped to replace government
monopolies with competitive markets. In most cases, it has now been recognised that the
core functions historically performed by government monopolies are in fact natural
monopolies, just as the advocates of government intervention had claimed.
However, the regulatory functions now being performed by bodies like the ACCC
are not new. In the past, these functions were performed by the same statutory monopolies
that provided the relevant services. From an engineering viewpoint, such integrated
management has obvious advantages. In most cases, however, the accountability that
arises from external regulation has yielded net benefits.
Labour market reform
As has already been noted, labour market policy under the Hawke government was
an exception to the general trend towards more market-oriented policy. The Accord on
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Prices and Incomes strengthened the role of central wage fixation through the ArbitrationCommission. Moreover, the policy deals through which the government and the Australian
Council of Trade Unions reached an agreed position involving low or negative growth in
real wages typically included interventionist policy initiatives, of which the most notable
were Medicare and compulsory superannuation.
The centralised approach was gradually abandoned in favour of a system of enterprise
bargaining, which remains the most important institutional framework for wage-setting.
Subsequent reforms, such as the introduction of Australian Workplace Agreements
(individually negotiated employment contracts) have had only a modest effect.
The effects of labour market reform, in the strict sense of changes to industrial
relations policies and institutional frameworks, appear to have been modest. However,
the changes in labour markets arising, directly or indirectly, from microeconomic reform,
have been dramatic. They include declining union membership, and a reduction in the
proportion of the workforce with traditional full-time jobs (35–45 hours per week) offset
by growth in both part-time (mostly casual) employment and in jobs with long working
hours (45+ per week). Policies that have affected labour market outcomes directly have
included competitive tendering, reductions in industry assistance and corporatisation or
privatisation of government business enterprises. Indirect, but equally profound effects
have arisen from financial market deregulation and the resulting increase in the influence
of financial markets.
Microeconomic reform and macroeconomic policy
The term ‘microeconomic reform’ reflects a conscious contrast with the
macroeconomic policies that dominated economic policy in Australia from World War II
to the late 1970s. However, perceptions of the relationship between microeconomic reform
and macroeconomic policy have changed over time.
The focus on microeconomic reform in the early 1980s reflected the failure of
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Keynesian stabilisation policies and the monetarist alternative of monetary growth rulesto reverse the rise in unemployment that took place during the 1970s. Along with the
rapid growth of the current account deficit following the floating of the dollar, persistent
high unemployment was seen as the product of structural rigidities which ensured that
policies of macroeconomic stimulus would result in higher inflation rather than growth in
output. Thus, microeconomic reform was initially advocated as an expansionary policy,
to be combined with stimulatory fiscal policy and the wage and price restraint generated
by the Accord on Prices and Incomes.
The favorable experience of the policy response to the ‘Banana Republic’ crisis of
1986, when a short-lived increase in interest rates succeeded in reducing the current
account deficit without generating a recession, led to a new hypothesis regarding the
impact of microeconomic reform. Many commentators, such as Higgins (1991) suggested
that the economy had become more ‘flexible’ in its response to economic shocks.
Among other things, the optimistic view of the benefits of reform reflected in
Higgins’ assessment was used to justify the maintenance of high interest rates during
1989, as a response to inflationary pressures and current account problems. The resulting
recession showed that the economy was not as flexible as had been hoped.
The recession was the longest and deepest in post-war history. The length and
strength of the expansion of the 1990s can be explained, in large measure, by the severity
of the preceding recession. The 10 years of expansion between 1993 and 2003 were just
sufficient to reduce the rate of unemployment to 5.6 per cent, the same rate prevailing in
1989, before the onset of the recession.
Although there was some shift to fiscal stimulus during the early years of the
recession, any systematic Keynesian policy was deprecated as ‘pump-priming’. The
government publicly adhered to a ‘medium-term strategy’, in which countercyclical fiscal
policy was eschewed, until 1992, following the replacement of Prime Minister Hawke by
Paul Keating. The medium-term strategy was generally supported by advocates of micro-
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economic reform who were concerned that the pace of reform might be slowed asgovernments sought to respond to high unemployment. The failure of the medium-term
macroeconomic strategy to offset the prolonged recession therefore undermined public
support for microeconomic reform.
In the last few years, the history of the late 1980s has repeated itself. The experience
of 1998, when Australia felt little impact from the Asian economic crisis has been
interpreted as evidence of the flexibility generated by microeconomic reform, as was the
successful management of the ‘Banana Republic’ crisis in 1986. Parham (2002a) observes:
Australia’s growth performance since the early 1990s has been
exceptional. For nine years, annual GDP growth averaged just
under 4 per cent – a performance not seen since the 1960s and
early 1970s. Strong growth even persisted in the midst of the
1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2001 global downturn.
A surge in productivity growth has underpinned Australia’s good
performance.
There are many reasons to doubt this analysis. First, because the Reserve Bank
correctly allowed the Australian dollar to depreciate against developed-country currencies,
the Asian crisis did not produce a net decline in export demand. Thus, the flexibility or
otherwise of the domestic economy was not tested. Exporters had to redirect exports
from Asian markets to developed countries, but given that many of these exports are
commodities traded in fairly well-developed markets, this was not a miraculous feat.
The 1990s growth rate of 4 per cent per year is not remarkable for a period of
economic expansion. The average growth rate in the 1980s expansion was about 4.5 per
cent. Thus, the distinguishing feature of the period since the early 1990s has been the
absence of a recession rather than the strength of normal economic growth.
On this point, there is no evidence for the general claim that ‘flexible’ free-market
economies are less susceptible to macroeconomic shocks than others. New Zealand,
where microeconomic reform was even more radical, but where macroeconomic policy
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was misjudged in 1997, experienced a significant downturn following the Asian crisis.More recently, claims that the US economy was recession-proof have been shown to be
baseless.
The experience of the past twenty years suggests that microeconomic reform can
coexist with good, bad or indifferent macroeconomic policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
Of course, the conclusion that microeconomic reform has had little impact on
macroeconomic stability is not relevant to the critical question of whether, other things
being equal, microeconomic reform helped to improve living standards. It is to this issue
that we now turn.
The benefits and costs of microeconomic reform
Assuming that macroeconomic rather than microeconomic policy is the main
determinant of aggregate employment levels, two kinds of benefits might be expected
from a well-designed program of microeconomic reform. First, the removal of price
distortions might be expected to improve allocative efficiency. Such improvements would
increase welfare but might not be captured in measures of gross domestic product. Second,
microeconomic reform might generate either static or dynamic improvements in technical
efficiency, which would be captured in measures of GDP and also of multifactor productivity.
Allocative efficiency
The most important single policy designed to improve allocative efficiency was
tariff reform, accompanied by reforms to agricultural price policy. Ex ante projections of
the results of reforms to tariffs and price policy were radically divergent. Supporters of the
existing policy regime predicted disaster (Warhurst 1982). Advocates of reform argued
that the ‘dynamic’ effects of reform would lead to the growth of an innovative manufacturing
sector producing elaborately transformed manufactured products for an essentially unlimited
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export market.At least in the medium term, it now seems clear that the outcomes of price policy
reform were consistent with a standard ‘static’ neoclassical model. The formerly protected
sector, import-competing manufacturing, contracted sharply. Growth in imports was
balanced by an expansion in exports, but manufactured exports did not expand as much
as was expected by many proponents of reform. Dynamic effects, if any, were modest.
Using a Harberger triangle approximation, Quiggin (1996) estimated that the removal
of tariffs generated a long-run net welfare gain equal to between 1 and 3 per cent of
GDP. The short run impacts were less favorable. The period of tariff reform in Australia
coincided almost exactly with the resurgence of mass unemployment throughout the
developed world. In the presence of high unemployment the adjustment costs associated
with tariff reform and other policies  are higher than in the case of full employment.
Moreover, because the variance of effective protection rates initially increased,
welfare was actually reduced under the case-by-case approach adopted during the 1970s,
as is shown in Table 2, which contains three sets of estimates of the welfare cost of
tariffs, calculated using the data presented in Table 1. The first set takes account of the
mean effective rate of protection but not of the variance. The second set, referred to as
the low range, is derived on the assumption that elasticities of demand and supply for
individual manufactured items are equal to 0.5, the same as the aggregate elasticities for
manufactured items as a group. The third set, referred to as the high range, is derived on
the assumption that elasticities of demand and supply for individual manufactured items
are equal to 1.0, twice the aggregate elasticities for manufactured items as a group.
The first row shows a monotonic reduction in the welfare cost of protection, with a
cumulative benefit equal to 1 per cent of GDP by 1991. The second and third rows show
a different pattern, in which welfare costs initially rose as a result of increasing variance
in protection rates. To calculate the welfare impact of the entire process, it would be
necessary to evaluate the present value of a stream of losses and gains. The results of
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Year ending June 30
1971 1973 1983 1988 1991
1.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2
1.9 1.1 2.5 1.7 1.1
2.5 1.5 4.3 3.0 1.9
An alternative view is that the most important indicator of the distorting effect of
tariffs are the ‘peak’ rates on the most highly protected industries (motor vehicles, and
textiles,clothing and footwear). These increased in the early period of tariff reform but
declined from the mid-1980s, suggesting that the period of positive net benefits began
earlier than estimated by Quiggin (1996).
Productivity — miracle or myth
A consistent theme in the advocacy of microeconomic reform has been the claim
that reform would lead to a sustained improvement in rates of economic growth and
would therefore permit growth in living standards. The first such claims were made by
Kasper et al. (1980). In reality, the first decade of microeconomic reform in Australia,
from 1983 to 1993 was characterised by poor productivity growth and weak economic
growth. Some of this poor performance may have been the result of pre-existing problems,
but the adverse impact of financial deregulation during the 1980s, and the rise of
‘entrepreneurs’ such as Bond, Skase and Elliott played a substantial role.
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The response of advocates of microeconomic reform has been to ‘restart the clock’,ignoring events before 1993, and focusing on performance during the economic expansion
that began in the early 1990s.
The claim that Australia has experienced a ‘productivity miracle’ has been made
repeatedly since the publication of ABS estimates suggesting that multifactor productivity
(MFP) growth had reach an unprecedented annual rate of 2.4 per cent between 1993-94
and 1997-98, compared to a long-run average of around 1 per cent. Subsequent revisions
and additional data yielded lower estimates of productivity growth, but no corresponding
reduction in rhetorical claims.
Because estimates of productivity growth rates for the 1980s were also revised
downwards, the measured change between the 1980s and 1990s was still large. Hence,
there was a shift in emphasis from the rate of productivity growth to the rate of acceleration
from the 1980s to the 1990s.  The shift in attention from the first derivative of productivity
(growth) to the second derivative (acceleration) raises complex problems of interpretation
that have, in general, been disregarded.
A fairly typical statement of the case may be found in Parham (2002a).
After showing its weakest rate in the 1980s, Australia’s
productivity growth accelerated to new highs in the 1990s —
labour productivity growth at an average 3.0 per cent a year and
multifactor productivity (MFP) growth at 1.8 per cent a year.
The most serious problem with this claim is that the term ‘the 1990s’, which would
normally be used to described a decade, refers a period of only six years, from 1993-94 to
1998-99, identified by the ABS as a ‘productivity cycle’. In the previous cycle, which
included the recession of 1989-90 the average rate of MFP growth was 0.7 per cent. In the
current incomplete cycle, beginning in 1999-00, the rate has averaged 0.5 per cent,as is
shown in Table 3.
The average productivity growth rate for the 1990s as a whole was well below that
21
reported by Parham.Given that data are presented on a financial year basis, there is someroom for debate about the appropriate starting and ending years. However it is calculated,
the rate of MFP growth for the 1990s as a whole is between 1.1 and 1.5 per cent, better
than the 1980s, but scarcely ‘exceptional’ in either historical or international terms.
Even if all the above-average MFP growth observed during the productivity cycle
from 1993-94 to 1998-99 were attributed to microeconomic reform, the cumulative benefit
would be equal to only 4.8 per cent of GDP, well below widely-publicised official
estimates for relatively minor parts of the reform program. For example, the Industry
Commission (1995) estimated the benefits of ‘Hilmer and related reforms’ at 5.5 per cent
of GDP. This estimate took no account of tariff reform, tax reform or financial deregulation.
In fact, however, at least part of the strong productivity growth of the mid-1990s
must have represented the usual recovery in productivity that follows a recession. Moreover,
given the poor productivity performance observed since 1998-99, it appears that some of
the productivity gains realised during the 1990s were unsustainable or illusory. As is
discussed below, productivity gains generated by increased work intensity are unlikely to
be sustainable in the long run.
Quiggin (2000a) noted that mid-1990s productivity growth was partly illusory. The
treatment of the of the business services sector, which grew rapidly in the mid-1990s as a
result of contracting out, but was inappropriately excluded from the market sector, induced
an upward bias in estimates of MFP growth. Inclusion of business services in the market
sector would have reduced the measured annual rate of MFP growth for the period from
1993-94 to 1998-99 by around 0.5 percentage points. It is possible that the magnitude of
the distortions associated with the treatment of the business services sector has declined
since 1998-99,contributing to the reduction in measured productivity growth noted above.
Work and work intensity
The most salient costs of microeconomic reform have been those borne by workers
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in the form of increased stress and a faster pace of work. The increase in work intensityimplies that effective labour input has grown more rapidly than measured hours of work,
while productivity and wages per unit of effort have grown more slowly than measured
productivity and hourly wages.
Although anecdotal evidence of increases in work intensity abounds, statistical
evidence is limited. The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey undertaken in
1995 found that a majority of employees reported increases in stress, work effort and the
pace of work over the previous year, while less than 10 per cent reported reductions in
any of these variables (Morehead et al. 1997).
Dawson et al. (2002) examine the increase in working hours for full-time workers
and conclude (p. 4):
For many Australian workers, their families and communities,
extended working hours have lead to increased levels of fatigue
and decreasing levels of social support. This in turn has the
potential to compromise safety and the long-term health and
wellbeing of workers and the organisations that employ them.
Similar evidence, based on time-use diaries, is provided by Bittman and Rice (2002).
Green and McIntosh (2001) provide evidence of increases in work intensity from
the United Kingdom which served as the model for many Australian microeconomic
reforms, notably including competitive tendering and contracting. Green and Macintosh
observe that the increases in work intensity are associated with higher productivity (as
would be expected) and are positively correlated with exposure to competition and with
reductions in union density.
Further evidence may be obtained from movements in working hours for full-time
workers. To the extent that an increase in working hours reflects a demand by employers
for increased work effort, standard microeconomic reasoning implies that work effort per
hour will also increase. Thus, we would expect to see work effort and hours of work
23
move together in most cases.Until about 1980, average hours of work for full-time employees had declined
fairly steadily for more than a century. Although there are no formal measures for work
intensity, any comparison of working conditions between 1980 and, say, 1950 or 1930
indicates a reduction in work intensity. Inadequate work intensity was frequently cited as
a reason for poor economic performance by advocates of microeconomic reform, such as
Blandy (1985).
Average hours of work for full-time employees rose between 1980 and 1994,
reaching a peak of 45 hours per week, before stabilising in the late 1990s and declining
slightly after 2000. Wooden and Loundes (2002) attribute the increase in working hours
to an income effect arising from wage restraint during the Accord period. This seems
plausible for the 1980s, but the continued increase in working hours after the end of the
Accord is almost certainly due to employer demands. For example, analysis of enterprise
bargaining negotiations at this time undertaken by the Australian Centre for Industrial
Relations Research and Training (1993) showed that employer claims typically included
items that would lead to longer and more flexible (at the employer's discretion) working
hours.
Public concern about stress and the intensity of work rose steadily in line with the
increase in full-time working hours. Concerns about inadequate work intensity, dominant
in the 1980s, were replaced by discussion of excessive work intensity, which reached a
high point in the late 1990s. The modest decline in full-time working hours that has been
observed since then is consistent with the view that the increase in working hours in the
early 1990s was a short-term response to the competitive pressure associated with micro-
economic reform and to the increase in employer bargaining power following the recession.
Since the issue of increased work intensity as a source of measured productivity
growth was first raised in the mid-1990s (see, for example, Quiggin 1996), one of the
central points in the debate has been the claim that increases in productivity generated by
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increased work intensity are unsustainable. The strong form of this claim is that workintensity will eventually return to levels more in line with workers' preferences, and that
the measured productivity increases associated with increased work intensity will be
reversed. The weak version is that, if work intensity stabilises at a higher level, the
measured rate of productivity growth will decline in the absence of continued growth in
unmeasured labour inputs. Conversely, as noted by Parham (2002b), continued growth in
productivity would imply that unsustainable growth in work intensity was not a major
source of measured productivity growth.
4
Growth accounting appears to support the strong version of the unsustainability
hypothesis. Full-time working hours declined after 1998-99 and it seems likely that work
intensity also declined. At the same time, the rate of multifactor productivity growth fell
below its long-run average.
The implications may be seen by supposing that increases in the pace of work
contributed a 5 per cent increase in effective labour input during the period from 1993-94
to 1998-99 (roughly equivalent to the loss of two 10-minute tea breaks each day), and
that half of this increase in work intensity has subsequently been reversed. If labour's
contribution to MFP is weighted at 70 per cent, this would imply that increased work
intensity contributed 3.5 percentage points of the 4.8 percentage point increase above the
long-term MFP trend observed in the mid-1990s cycle, and that decreased work intensity
contributed 1.75 percentage points of the 2 percentage point shortfall in MFP growth,
relative to the long-term trend, observed since 1999-00.
Income and inequality
As Parham (2002b) observes, inequality in market incomes grew in both decades of
the microeconomic reform period:
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4 To be more precise, it is necessary to focus on productivity growth in excess of the long-term
trend growth rate of 1 per cent.
The distribution of earnings among individuals became moreunequal in the 1990s. However, the increase was a continuation
of the growth in earnings inequality during the 1980s, rather
than a step up in the 1990s.
This finding is consistent with international evidence suggesting that market-oriented
reform is associated with increasing inequality of incomes. Inequality has risen substantially
in the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand.
In Australia, until the mid-1990s, growth in earnings inequality was offset, at least
in part, by changes in the tax and welfare systems that were on balance, progressive.
Since 1996, a number of these changes have been reversed as a result of the extension of
microeconomic reform into the tax–welfare system. The most important single changes
have been the cuts in income tax rates for higher income earners introduced as part of A
New Tax System, cuts in capital gains taxes and restrictions on access to welfare payments,
generically referred to as ‘mutual obligation’.
Consumer choice and welfare
In most, but not all, cases, microeconomic reform has been associated with an
expansion of consumer choice. Although there are few well-established techniques for
measurement of the benefits of consumer choice, standard revealed preference arguments
imply that more choice is always beneficial. These arguments are based on the standard
model of individual consumer sovereignty. In some cases, communitarian critics of such
arguments may argue that the benefits of individual choice are offset by losses of community
values.
The expansion of shopping hours provides an example. From the viewpoint of
individual consumers, an expansion of shopping hours is certainly beneficial. Since this
benefit is not taken into account in standard measures of the output of the retail sector,
this is an instance where the productivity benefits of microeconomic reform are understated.
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From a communitarian perspective, however, the expansion of shopping hours haseroded traditional distinctions between weekdays and weekends, and undermined a range
of community activities premised on the assumption that nearly everyone will have
weekends free of work.
Summary
In aggregate, microeconomic reform has been associated with a modest increase in
the rate of growth of labour productivity, most of which can be attributed to increases in
the pace and intensity of work. The extra growth in MFP during the productivity cycle of
the 1990s, equivalent to 4.8 per cent of GDP represents an upper bound for the aggregate
benefits of microeconomic reform. A correct estimate would be closer to zero, and possibly
even negative.
Rather than seeking to justify a comprehensive program of microeconomic reform
in terms of largely spurious productivity benefits, or on the basis of unrelated arguments
about macroeconomic performance, it is preferable to assess individual reforms on a
case-by-case basis. As has been argued above, some reforms have yielded positive net
benefits but others have not.
Concluding comments
The set of policy programs advocated under the banner of ‘microeconomic reform’
is too complex, and the associated set of outcomes too varied, to admit any simple
characterisation. Microeconomic reform has been neither the success claimed by advocates
such as the Productivity Commission, nor the disaster implied by many popular critiques
of ‘economic rationalism’.
Taking the two decades of microeconomic reform as a whole, the aggregate impact
of the reform program on the welfare of the Australian community has been small.
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Periods of strong growth in productivity and output, such as the mid-1990s, did littlemore than recover the ground lost as a result of the impact of the activities of ‘entrepreneurs’
in the 1980s, and the associated ‘recession we had to have’. Much of the apparent
productivity growth of the 1990s  has been dissipated as workers find ways of winding
back the increase in the hours and intensity of work extracted through the unilateral
repudiation of implicit labour contracts in this period.
As with the curate's egg, the only verdict on microeconomic reform that is both
brief and accurate is that it is ‘good in parts’.
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301964-65 to 1968-69 to 1973-74 to 1981-82 to
1984-85 to  1988-89 to 1993-94 to
1968-69 1973-74 1981-82 1984-85
1988-89 1993-94 1998-99 Full
Labour productivity 2.5  2.9  2.4  2.2 
0.8  2.0  3.2  2.4
Capital productivity(f) -0.8  -0.5  -1.4  -1.8 
-0.2  -1.3  -0.1  -0.9
Multifactor productivity 1.2  1.6  1.1  0.8 
0.4  0.7  1.8  1.1
GDP-market sector(h) 5.1  4.6  2.1  1.8 
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